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Abstract—Growth of civil air traffic and new entrants into
the air transportation sector such as Unmanned Aeronautical
Vehicles (UAV) pose a great challenge for air traffic management
and its supporting Communication, Navigation and Surveillance
(CNS) infrastructure. Analogue systems have to be replaced by
digital systems to optimize spectrum efficiency, and automation
needs to be introduced to support human decision making
at scale. As safety and security are strongly intertwined in
aviation, cybersecurity is one key enabler for digitalization
in civil aviation. However, few deployed digital aeronautical
communications systems incorporate dedicated cybersecurity
measures. Link requirements of low latency, low bandwidth, and
long range make aeronautical datalinks especially challenging
in terms of security design. Further, challenging are the nature
of wireless communication itself and the political boundaries
in international air transportation concerning unique commu-
nication participant identification. Thus, this paper proposes a
concept for a challenge-response (CR) based Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) Mutual Authentication Key Exchange scheme,
short PMAKE, binding communication identity and radio device
together. Initial evaluations showed its suitability for the digital
aeronautical communications system LDACS.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity, Mutual Authentication and Key
Exchange (MAKE), Physical Unclonable Function (PUF), Digi-
tal Aeronautical Communications, L-band Digital Aeronautical
Communications System (LDACS)
I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing digitization process nowadays has also
spillovers in the civil aeronautical industry, especially affecting
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) infras-
tructure. The Single European Sky Air Traffic Management
Research (SESAR)1 program in the European Union (EU) and
NextGEN2 in the US have been tasked with the development
of new technologies to create an aeronautical Future Commu-
nications Infrastructure (FCI). Wireless technology candidates
for the FCI are the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Commu-
nication System (AeroMACS) for airport communications,
the satellite communications for oceanic, polar and remote
1https://www.sesarju.eu/, Oct. 14, 2020
2https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/, Oct. 14, 2020
domains, and the L-band Digital Aeronautical Communica-
tion System (LDACS) for long-range terrestrial aeronautical
communications [29]. In this paper we focus on LDACS.
As safety and security are strongly interrelated in aviation,
strong cybersecurity is the foundation and precondition for
digitization in aviation [14]. However, cybersecurity for CNS
is unfortunately not realized in most deployed systems [9],
[27], [31]. One of the few systems in the ecosystem, which
has a dedicated cybersecurity architecture is AeroMACS as
it was based on the IEEE 802.16 WiMAX standard [19].
Central to the security of AeroMACS lies its Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) building a chain of trust originating from
a root Certificate Authority (CA) [21]. This turned out to be
problematic, since a root of trust has to be declared that all
ICAO state actors can trust directly or via cross certification.
Security infrastructure becomes therefore entangled with the
political reality of aviation, which is a small number of
dominant state actors capable of securing critical infrastructure
with limited trust towards others. For these others a PKI
becomes a less attractive solution for an aeronautical trust
framework. AeroMACS is therefore not widely deployed.
Besides the mentioned situation with AeroMCS, we also
have to consider the technical requirements for aeronautical
datalinks representing the highest challenges for security sup-
port in aeronautic: (1) The low additional security latency and
(2) the low additional security overhead as prompted by the
long range and limited available bandwidth of aeronautical
wireless systems. Further, political boundaries in international
transportation concerning unique communication participant
identification must be respected.
With these challenges in place, it is clear that traditional
certificate-based authenticated key exchange schemes might be
too expensive in terms of political issues, security overhead,
and maintenance expense on digital aeronautical links [2].
Tackling the issue of certificates, trust, and low security data
overhead, the Internet of Things (IoT) sector and solutions
like Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-based Challenge-

















ATN =  Air Traffic Network
AOC = Aeronautical Operational Control
ATS = Air Traffic Services
AS = Aircraft Station
GS = Ground Station
GSC = Ground Station Controller
RL = Reverse Link 
FL = Forward Link 
Fig. 1. Network architecture of LDACS [22]
(MAKE) schemes [7], [8], [18] come into focus. These
solutions offer ways for binding communication entity and
radio device together without the need for centrally managed
certificates.
Thus, the objective of this paper is to investigate the
combination of PUF, key exchange methods such as Diffie-
Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) and CR-based mutual au-
thentication and Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols
for application in the aeronautical domain. The outcomes lead
us to our proposed PUF-based Mutual Authentication Key
Exchange scheme called PMAKE.
The paper is structured as follow: Section II presents insides
to LDACS together with its frame structure, PUF theory, and
DHKE theory. Security assumptions and detailed objectives
are presented in Section III. PMAKE itself is discussed in
detail in Section IV followed by the respective evaluation in
Section V. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND ON LDACS, PUF AND DHKE
As stated in Section I an efficient security solution needs to
be designed and developed in order to establish cybersecurity
support in CNS infrastructure, especially in aeronautics. First
investigations were undertaken by specifying a cybersecurity
architecture for LDACS proposing several security solutions
[22], [24]–[26]. As digitization goes onward and attackers
become more inventive the defense strategies and protocols
need to improve further. Thus, the idea came up to combine
PUF and DHKE methods with each other, as realized by our
PMAKE scheme. Before diving into the solution we present
here background information to make our taken design and
implementation decisions (cf. Section IV) understandable.
A. LDACS Theory
LDACS is a ground-based digital communications system
for flight guidance and communications related to the safety
and regularity of flight. It has been developed in Europe and
is currently under standardization by ICAO.
Figure 1 depicts involved components and communication
links. Up to 512 Aircraft Station (AS) communicate to an
LDACS Ground Station (GS) in the Reverse Link (Reverse
Link (RL)), GS communicate to AS in the Forward Link
(Forward Link (FL)). GSs are controlled by a Ground Station
Fig. 2. Frame structure of LDACS [13]
Controller (GSC). The GSC connects the LDACS sub-network
to the global Air Traffic Network (Air Traffic Network (ATN))
to which the corresponding Air Traffic Services (Air Traffic
Services (ATS)) and Aeronautical Operational Control (Aero-
nautical Operational Control (AOC)) end systems are attached.
As we will need a detailed understanding of LDACS frame
structure design in the evaluation Section V, we will briefly
discuss this here.
In the FL direction, each Super Frame (SF) starts with a
Broadcast (BC) slot, where the GS announces its existence
to the AS and sends physical parameters for link establish-
ment. The rest of the FL SF is split into four Multi Frames
(MFs), each containing nine Orthogonal Frequency-Division
Multiplexing (OFDM) frames and each frame comprises three
FL Physical Layer Service Data Units (PHY-SDUs). Every FL
PHY-SDU can be used to transmit FL user data or Common
Control (CC) data, in which GS can allocate resources to
an AS. In the RL, a SF starts with a Random Access (RA)
slot, where AS can request access to an LDACS cell, and
continues with four MFs. Each RL MF is constructed from 162
RL PHY-SDUs equivalent to Orthogonal Frequency-Division
Multiple Access (OFDMA) tiles. They are used for two
purposes, namely (1) to transmit Dedicated Control (DC) data,
which are used by an AS to request the allocation for resources
allowing them to send on the RL and (2) to transmit RL user
data.
Those details are depicted in Figure 2. For more details of
LDACS framing, we refer to [13].
LDACS covers current ATS, AOC data and also future
applications, enables new concepts (e.g., sectorless Air Traffic
Management (ATM)) and has at least an order of magnitude
more net capacity than the currently used terrestrial links
like the VHF Digital Link Mode 2 (VDLm2) system [13].
Instead of kilobits per second, LDACS offers up to 2 Mbps.
By enabling not only communication but also navigation and
surveillance at the same time, it is the world’s first integrated
CNS system [29].
Over time several security algorithms were integrated into
the initial LDACS cybersecurity architecture [24]–[26]. How-
ever, aeronautical systems in general and LDACS in particular
do not offer high data rates as depicted in [23]. In order to
address this problem we recommend
1) to reduce security message exchanges between GSC, GS
and AS,
2) to eliminate the need of the integration of a PKI into the
LDACS security framework, and
3) to uniquely bind identification and radio device, respec-
tively the actual physical aircraft.
These three recommendations are followed by our proposed
PMAKE scheme and is presented in Sections IV and V.
B. PUF’s Theory
A silicon PUF is a mapping f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
with n challenge bits and m response bits. The response is
derived when applying the n challenge bit onto the intractably
complex instance-specific unique system behaviour [30].
PUFs use device unique random patterns, which are introduced
in the manufacturing process to differentiate chips and make
them uniquely identifiable. Hence, a PUF can be interpreted
as a unique device’s fingerprint, an enabler to create a unique
set of CR pairs and a strong random number generator.
PUFs have been used for the identification, key-generation
phase and as basis for encryption schemes [8]. The remarkable
feature is the ability of the protocol to mutual authenticate
entities, without storing Challenge-Response-Pairs (CRPs) at
the verifier. As data links for IoT based networks share some
similarities with the aeronautical sector such as low latency
and low bandwidth with a fast changing network, solutions
here are of particular interest. For example, there exist PUF-
based mutual authentication schemes for IoT [5] and end-to-
end AKE schemes [7] already.
Our PMAKE scheme picks up the concept of so called Static
Random-Access Memory (SRAM) PUFs [16]. The underlying
idea is that the physical properties of every transistor in an
integrated circuit differs from another due to small, submicron
variations in the production process. Electronic properties such
as transistor threshold voltages or gain factor are different
and unique per chip and as the variations during production
are not controllable, this creates unique, unclonable physical
properties per chip. An important fact to note is, that SRAM
PUF derived keys are only extracted from the chip when
needed and thus no key is present when the chip is powered
off.
Thus the PUF can be combined with an arbitrary amount of
arbitrary challenges to produce an arbitrary amount of device
unique responses without the responses being available and
accessible to an adversary when the chip is powered down.
This capability will be used in the proposed PMAKE solution
in Section IV.
C. DHKE’s Theory
The original DHKE was first published in 1976 and is
based on the discrete logarithm or Diffie-Hellman problem
[10]: Given a cyclic group G of prime order n, a generator
g of G and elements gx, gy ∈ G, find gxy . A Man-in-the-
Middle attack is possible when no authentication or additional
security features are used [3], which is why authenticated
DHKE schemes (e.g., Station to Station (STS), Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) and IKE version 2 (IKEv2) protocols [4] were
invented.
In order to reduce key sizes, other abelian groups [20]
were investigated. One cryptographic platform here was
the use of elliptic curves over finite fields, resulting in
the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement
protocol [1], [20]. Hardening cryptographic protocols for
quantum resistance follows the idea of quantum-resistant
public-key cryptosystems based on the conjectured difficulty
of finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves was
formulated in 2006 by Rostovtsev et al. [28] and extended
for key exchange applications by Jao et al. in 2011 [17].
This scheme is called Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman
(SIDH) and represents a post-quantum robust version
of the DHKE.
For our PMAKE scheme we will use the basic principle of
any of the three previously mentioned DHKE. We assume that
each communicating party chooses a secret key and performs
any DHKE type specific mathematical operation to derive a
public key to be used in further message exchanges. This
allows the Physical Unclonable Function based Mutual Au-
thentication Key Exchange (PMAKE) scheme to use different
DHKE types, depending on the situation.
III. SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS AND OBJECTIVES
Our proposed PMAKE scheme was influenced by following
four security assumptions from [4], which uphold for the
main phase of PMAKE:
S1: The adversary is able to eavesdrop on all messages sent
in a cryptographic protocol.
S2: The adversary is able to alter all messages sent in a
cryptographic protocol using any information available.
In addition the adversary can re-route any message to
any other principal. This includes the ability to generate
and insert completely new messages.
S3: The adversary may be a legitimate protocol participant
(an insider), or an external party (an outsider), or a
combination of both.
S4: An adversary is able to obtain the value of the session
key KAB used in any sufficiently old previous run of
the protocol.
We design the PMAKE scheme in the context of the Dolev
and Yao model [11]. To be able to prove security properties
of communication protocols, one has to additionally model
the attacker, since he or she (possibly) plays an active part in
each run of the protocol. Following the works of Dolev and
Yao, the ideal and most powerful attacker is assumed, who
can create, intercept or modify any message in the network,
spoof any identity and even compromise long term keys.
Bilzhause et. al identified five objectives to secure LDACS
[2]. These five objectives were later extended to nine objec-
tives in the LDACS Standards and Recommended Practises
(SARPS) endorsed by International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO) [15], namely (1) to protect availability and
continuity of service, to protect (2) integrity, (3) authenticity
for user and control plane messages in transit, (4) provide non-
repudiation of origin, (5) confidentiality for user plane mes-
sages in transit, (6) mutual entity authentication, (7) authorize
explicitly permitted actions of users or entities, (8) prevent
the propagation of intrusions within LDACS domains and to-
wards external domains and (9) protect against service attacks
to a level consistent with the application service requirements.
Overall, to fulfill any of these objective, some key exchange
and mutual authentication procedure must take place at the
very beginning of connection establishment. The objective
of the LDACS’s PMAKE scheme is to establish a shared
session key K between any two parties AS and GSC, in
which they can have “mutual belief”, following the definition
of Boyd [4]: “Mutual belief in the key K is provided for
B only if K is a good key for use with A, an A wishes to
communicate wit B using key K which A believes is good
for that purpose.” Following the hierarchy of authentication
and key establishment goals of Boyd, this mutual belief goal
can be split up into the sub-goals entity authentication, key
confirmation and good key. Additionally, we want to address
the issue of compromised long-term keys.
Summarizing this we define the following three objectives
O1-O3 for PMAKE:
O1: Mutual Authentication means, both parties can be sure
of each others identity and that both participated in this
interaction.
O2: Secure Key Agreement assumes, both parties have estab-
lished a shared session key that is fresh and can be use
for a certain time between them only.
O3: Perfect Forward Secrecy means, the established session
key remains secret, even when long term keys of the
involved parties have been compromised after the session.
IV. THE PMAKE SCHEME
Assuming a verifier wants to authenticate i nodes using
traditional PUF-based authentication protocols (e.g., A and
B) he needs to store j numbers of k-bit long challenges and
l-bit long corresponding responses, accumulating to a space
complexity of O((k + l)× i× j). Reducing this number, we
loosely orient ourselves on the HMAC-based RFID PUF mu-
tual authentication protocol (HPK), as it has already reduced
space complexity to O((k+ l)× i) [18]. This means, for every
node only one CRP has to be maintained. With every protocol
run a new CRP is securely exchanged, making the amount of
protocol runs independent of the stored amount of CRPs.
A. Notations and Prerequisites
The notations for the following PMAKE scheme are listed
in Table I following the notation by [4] for the key exchange
part of the protocol.
Following previous works in designing MAKE protocols
for LDACS [26], we aim to build a secure connection between
TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED IN THE PMAKE SCHEME
Notation Definition
msg1 ⊕ msg2 XOR operation on msg1 with msg2
msg1 | msg2 Concatenation operation on msg1 with msg2
PUFA Physical Unclonable Function of entity A
HMACK(msg) Hash-based Message Authentication Code
with key K and input data msg
HKDF(K) HMAC Key Derivation Function (HKDF)
with input K
CAi i-th Challenge for PUF from entity A
RAi i-th Response from PUF from entity A
IDA Identifier of entity A
rA Random integers of entity A
”Ephemeral private key”
tA Ephemeral public key of entity A
g Public Diffie-Hellman parameters
SAS,GSC Static Diffie-Hellman key shared between
AS and GSC
KAS,GSC Session key for AS-GSC communications
{msg}K Encrypted data msg with key K
GSC and AS, with the GS just being the intermediary, forward-
ing all messages over the air gap to the AS and via the ground
based backbone back to the GSC. Every mobile node (aircraft)
is equipped with a SRAM PUF during the construction process
of the specific LDACS radio device. Communication partners
AS and GSC will have to have previously agreed upon the
chosen DHKE variation and respective public parameters.
Similar to previous works [25], [26], the ground based entities
GSC and GS will have established a secure connection prior
to a PMAKE scheme run. Note, it is essential for PMAKE’s
success that the setup phase where the initial generation of a
CRP happens (cf. Section IV-B) will have to remain secure.
Compromise of the first CRP renders the protocol insecure.
Further, the public ephemeral keys of the DHKE requires to
fulfill two purposes, namely (1) being key material, (2) serving
as nonces. Thus for every run of the protocol rA will have to
be chosen anew.
B. The Setup Phase
PMAKE’s Setup Phase starts with an agreement between
GSC and AS as illustrated in Figure 3. They need to have
agreed upon a choice of a DHKE method and its public
parameter g, HMAC, HKDF and on a suitable symmetric
encryption algorithm. Next, the GSC sends a challenge CAS0
to the AS. Then the AS calculates a response making use of
the SRAM PUF and the challenge CAS0 producing RAS0 . The
response is send back to the GSC. As last step in this phase,
the GSC securely stores < CAS0 , RAS0 > and the AS stores
< CAS0 >.
GSC AS
Has: HMAC,HKDF, g Has: HMAC,HKDF, g, PUFAS
Generate: CAS0
CAS0
Generate: CAS0 → PUFAS → RAS0
RAS0
Store: < CAS0 , RAS0 > Store: < CAS0 >
Fig. 3. PMAKE’s Setup Phase
Ground Station Controller (GSC) Ground Station (GS) Aircraft Station (AS)
Has: HMAC,HKDF, g,< CAS0 , RAS0 > Has: HMAC,HKDF, g, PUFAS , < CAS0 >
Step 1 : |IDGS |
Step 2 :
Generate: rAS , Calculate: tAS , Generate: CAS0 → PUFAS → RAS0
Calculate: α = HMACRAS0 (IDAS , IDGS , tAS)
|tAS ⊕ CAS0 |α|IDAS |
Step 3 : |tAS ⊕ CAS0 |α|IDAS |IDGS |
Step 4 :
Calculate: tAS = tAS ⊕ CAS0 ⊕ CAS0
Calculate: α′ = HMACRAS0 (IDAS , IDGS , tAS)
Verify: α′ == α, If match then AS is authentic
Generate: rGSC , Calculate: tGSC
Calculate shared key: SAS,GSC with rGSC and tAS
Derive session key: KAS,GSC = HKDF (SAS,GSC)
Generate: CAS1
Calculate: β = HMACRAS0 (IDGSC , IDGS , IDAS , tGSC , tAS)
Calculate: γ = HMACRAS0 (CAS1 )
|β ⊕ CAS1 |tGSC ⊕ tAS |γ|IDGSC |
Step 5 : |β ⊕ CAS1 |tGSC ⊕ tAS |γ|IDGSC |
Step 6 :
Calculate: tGSC = tGSC ⊕ tAS ⊕ tAS
Calculate: β′ = HMACRAS0 (IDGSC , IDGS , IDAS , tGSC , tAS)
Calculate: CAS1 = β ⊕ CAS1 ⊕ β
′, Calculate: γ′ = HMACRAS0 (CAS1 )
Verify: γ′ == γ, If match then GSC is authentic
Calculate shared key: SAS,GSC with rAS and tGSC
Derive session key: KAS,GSC = HKDF (SAS,GSC)
Generate: CAS1 → PUFAS → RAS1
Calculate: δ = HMACRAS1 (IDAS , IDGS , IDGSC , tAS , tGSC)
Calculate: ε = CAS1 ⊕RAS1
Store: < CAS1 >, Erase from device: < RAS1 >
{δ|ε}KAS,GSC
Step 7 : {δ|ε}KAS,GSC
Step 8 :
Decrypt: {δ|ε}KAS,GSC
Calculate: RAS1 = CAS1 ⊕ ε
Calculate: δ′ = HMACRAS1 (IDAS , IDGS , IDGSC , tAS , tGSC)
Verify: δ′ == δ, If match update new CRP: < CAS1 , RAS1 >
Fig. 4. PMAKE’s Main Phase
C. The Main Phase
In case the setup phase was passed successful PMAKE
continues with its Main Phase. Figure 4 illustrates required
steps and message exchanges that are:
1) After GSC and GS have established a secure connection,
the GS starts broadcasting its identity IDGS regularly.
2) The AS, upon receiving such a beacon, generates a
random number rAS and depending on the respec-
tively chosen DHKE procedure calculates tAS and α =
HMACRAS0 (IDAS , IDGS , tAS). It then responds with
|tAS ⊕ CAS0 |α|IDAS |.
3) Once the GS receives the response to the beacon mes-
sage, it appends its ID to the message and forwards
|tAS ⊕ CAS0 |α|IDAS |IDGS | to the GSC.
4) With the help of the previously stored tuple
< CAS0 , RAS0 >, the GSC can compute the public
key of the AS tAS = tAS ⊕ CAS0 ⊕ CAS0 and
α′ = HMACRAS0 (IDAS , IDGS , tAS). It then checks
whether α′ == α match. If that is the case, the
AS has authenticated to the GSC. Then the GSC
generates a random number rGSC of its own and
again in dependence on the previously agreed DHKE
procedure, calculates tGSC . Now the shared AS-GSC
key SAS,GSC can be calculated via the secret of the
GSC rGSC and the public key of the AS tAS . With
that, the GSC calculates the session key KAS,GSC
via the HKDF and SAS,GSC . Finally a new challenge
CAS1 is chosen by the GSC and two new MAC tags
are calculated. β is used to conceal CAS1 , while γ
serves as authenticity proof about the GSC for the AS.
It finally sends |β ⊕CAS1 |tGSC ⊕ tAS |γ|IDGSC | to the
GS.
5) The GS forwards that message to the AS.
6) First the AS calculates the public key of the
GSC via tGSC = tGSC ⊕ tAS ⊕ tAS . To be
able to decipher CAS1 , β
′ is calculated by the
AS by reconstructing RAS0 and using previously
established values tGSC , tAS , IDGSC , IDGS , IDAS .
As CAS1 = β⊕CAS1⊕β′ the AS successfully received
the new challenge CAS1 . It then calculates its own
value for γ′ = HMACRAS0 (CAS1) and compares
γ′ = γ. If they match, the GSC has authenticated
to the AS. Furthermore the verifiable integrity and
return of tAS proves to the AS, that the GSC actually
participated in the protocol. Now the AS calculates the
shared key SAS,GSC with rAS and tGSC and derives
the session key KAS,GSC = HKDF (SAS,GSC).
Via the AS PUF a new response RAS1 is
generated to the new challenge CAS1 via
CAS1 → PUFAS → RAS1 . It then calculates
δ = HMACRAS1 (IDAS , IDGS , IDGSC , tAS , tGSC)
that will be used by the GSC as proof
for the authenticity and correctness of the new
response RAS1 . ε = CAS1 ⊕ RAS1 is used to conceal
the response RAS1 during transport. At this point,
the AS securely stores CAS1 and erases RAS1 from
memory. As AS and GSC have previously agreed upon
suitable encryption algorithms, the AS sends δ and ε
encrypted with KAS,GSC back to the GSC.
7) The GS forwards that message to the GSC.
8) The GSC decrypts the message with the agreed
upon encryption algorithm and key KAS,GSC . It then
computes RAS1 = CAS1 ⊕ ε. It then calculates
δ′ = HMACRAS1 (IDAS , IDGS , IDGSC , tAS , tGSC)
and checks whether δ′ == δ. If that is the case,
the GSC can be sure of the authenticity of the re-
sponse RAS1 and the participation of AS in the pro-
tocol. It updates the current tuple for that AS to
< CAS1 , RAS1 >.
Assuming everything went fine, Secure user data commu-
nication between AS and GSC can now commence with the
session key KAS,GSC . After a successful encrypted user data
message exchange between AS and GSC, also key confirma-
tion is achieved. If during PMAKE’s Main Phase anything
went wrong the total process must be performed again.
V. LDACS BASED EVALUATION OF PMAKE
In this section we will evaluate our proposed PMAKE
scheme using a special latency emulation model, which is first
introduced here. PMAKE itself is assumed to meet our security
assumptions and objectives from Section III. Thus, we evaluate
used message sizes and introduced data/latency overhead due
to the new security implementation.
A. Latency Model
In 2015, Gräupl et al. [12] presented a full methodology
on how to emulate latencies for user data in the forward and
reverse link (FL/RL) of LDACS depending on the bit error
rate and message size, which was updated in [26]. Taking
retransmissions into account, FL latency can be calculated as
LFL(t) = mFL(t) + (1 + δRX(1 + n))× dMF (1)
and RL latency as
LRL(t) = mRL(t) + (2 + δRX(N + 3))× dMF . (2)
In Equation 1, we use mFL(t) to classify the time until
the start of the next CC frame, δRX ∈ {0, 1} to indicate a
retransmission, dMF to denote the length of a MF and n is
TABLE II
PARAMETER VALUES FOR LATENCY TIMING FOR THE LDACS MEDIUM
ACCESS LAYER (MAC) PROTOCOL.
Forward Link Model Reverse Link Model
LFL(t) = mFL(t)+ LRL(t) = mRL(t)+
(1 + δRX(1 + n))× dMF (2 + δRX(N + 3))× dMF
Para- Values Para- Values
meters meters
dMF 60ms dMF 60ms
mFL(t) Time until start mRL(t) Average time until
of next FL MF: start of next
Every 1 to 60ms MAC cycle:




n Average amount of N Average amount of
MF after transmission MF after transmission
until next DC slot is until next DC slot
scheduled for AS scheduled for AS
in MAC-cycle: in MAC-cycle:
n = #AS/32 N = (#AS/32− 3)
mod #AS/32
BER 0, 10−6, 10−5
P P ({no error in packet}) = (1−BER)l
P ({error in packet}) = 1− ((1−BER)l)
derived from the length of the reverse link medium access
cycle from forward link perspective. In Equation 2, we use
mRL(t) to denote the time until the start of next DC slot,
δRX ∈ {0, 1} to indicate a retransmission, dMF to denote the
length of a MF and N is derived from the length of the reverse
link medium access cycle from reverse link perspective.
We model δRX ∈ {0, 1} as stochastic process, based on
the packet error rate. Given a Bit Error Rate (BER), we can
calculate the packet error rate based on the length of a packet
l: P ({no error in packet}) = (1−BER)l. Thus the opposite
event, that a packet indeed contains an error is: P ({error in
packet}) = 1 − ((1 − BER)l). These two probability decide
the value of δRX , whether a retransmission is necessary and,
thus, an error appeared in the packet, or not. For more details
on this model we refer to [12] and [26]. In Table II we list
the used parameters for LDACS’s MAC protocol, necessary
for the PMAKE’s evaluation.
For the upcoming evaluation here, we will first
assign bit sizes to each message and then calculate
data overhead and latency based on that. We will
use the notions ClientHelloKeyExchange (Step
2), ServerKeyExchangeF inished (Step 4) and
ClientKeyExchangeF inished (Step 6) for the AS-
GSC exchanged PMAKE messages. Please note, steps are
referred to according to Figure 4 and that the first message
exchanged in Step 1 is part of regular control broadcast
messages by the GS and thus not part of our evaluation.
B. Message Sizes
Every LDACS message has to have a header at the begin-
ning of a user data message, which is 48bit long. Sizes of tAS ,
tGSC vary depending on the choice of DHKE procedure. The
following recommended bit sizes for cryptographic material
are all taken from [6], Diffie-Hellman public keys lengths are
chosen similar to [26] leading to:
tGSC : {DHKE = 3072|ECDH = 256|SIDH = 2624}
and tAS : {DHKE = 3072|ECDH = 256|SIDH = 2640}.
As recommended in [6] a challenge ”should have a minimum
entropy of 100bits” we decided that the Message Authentica-
tion Code (MAC) tag’s length is 128bit for PMAKE. A MAC
is derived from any operation in PMAKE that involves the
HMAC function, as the result of HMAC is a MAC tag (e.g.,
α is a MAC tag with α = HMACRAS0 (IDAS , IDGS , tAS)
from step 2, together with β, γ, δ and ε).
Identities are already specified in the official LDACS speci-
fication [13] for AS and GS: IDAS is 28bit and IDGS 12bit
long. For the length of IDGSC we assume another 28bit.
C. Data Overhead
If we assign the aforementioned message sizes now to every
PMAKE message, we get the following sizes, depending on
the chosen DHKE procedure (c.f. Section IV-B):
A ClientHelloKeyExchange consists of a header = 48,
tAS = {DHKE = 3072, ECDH = 256, SIDH = 2640}
xored with the challenge CAS0 (resulting in the same bit
lengths as tAS), a MAC tag α = 128 and the aircraft ID
IDAS = 28, totalling in {3276, 460, 2844}bits.
A ServerKeyExchangeF inished consists of a header =
48, a MAC tag xored with the new challenge β⊕CAS1 = 128,
both tGSC and tAS xored together resulting in {DHKE =
3072, ECDH = 256, SIDH = 2624}, another MAC tag
γ = 128 and the GSC ID IDGSC = 28, totalling in
{3404, 588, 2972}bits.
Finally the ClientKeyExchangeF inished consists of a
header = 48 and two MAC tags δ = 128 and ε = 128
totalling in 304bits.
Overall this amounts to the total message sizes for PMAKE
shown in Table III.
TABLE III




Now we use the latency evaluation methodology intro-
duced in Section V-A and calculate LDACS latencies for the
PMAKE, depending on the BER on the link and the amount
of AS in an LDACS cell. We will use the three BER levels
mentioned in Table II, namely 0 BER for getting a baseline
authentication latency, BER of 10−6, the working point of
LDACS, and a BER of 10−5 for a worst case BER.
Authentication Latency Baseline: With BER = 0, the
different sizes of the DHKE variations have no impact on
the latency times as no retransmission due to lost packets
is necessary. In Figure 5 we see that minimum PMAKE
authentication latency values range from 300ms with few AS
in a cell to 2200ms when the LDACS cell is full. For maximum
values, we see ranges from 480ms for few aircraft to 2400ms
for a full LDACS cell.
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Fig. 5. Baseline authentication latency of PMAKE depending of the amount
of AS in an LDACS cell at BER= 0.
Authentication Latency with realistic BER: For the evalu-
ation under realistic BER, we emulated 10,000 authentication
attempts per AS in the LDACS cell to get a realistic view
on the authentication latency times, following the same argu-
mentation as in [26]. At a BER of 10−6, retransmissions and
thus the choice of DHKE flavor does not play a large role
for the authentication latency. Thus independent of the choice
of DHKE procedure, mean PMAKE authentication latency
ranges from 420ms for 1 AS in a cell to 2300ms for 512 AS
in a cell. The 95%-Percentiles range from 480ms to 2360ms.
At a BER of 10−5, retransmissions and thus the choice of
DHKE flavor do play a large role. Figure 6 reveals, that the
bigger key sizes of DHKE and SIDH trigger more reliably re-
transmissions in the 95%-Percentiles cases and thus PMAKE-
ECDH turns out to be about 1000ms faster in the worst case
with a full LDACS cell. Apart from that, we see that on
average all procedures take again between 480ms to 2400ms.
0 100 200 300 400 500



















Fig. 6. Authentication latency of the PMAKE scheme depending of the
amount of AS in an LDACS cell and DHKE at BER=10−5.
Note that the small peaks in the result for less than 3× 32 AS
are caused by the DC slot falling into an unfavorable
position for retransmissions as calculated by N in Table II.
E. Evaluation Findings
Overall PMAKE allows for mutual authentication and key
exchange capabilities between ground and aircraft without the
use of a PKI or digital certificates. The only prerequisite is
that a CRP is exchanged previously to the main phase of the
protocol and is kept secret until the next CRP is used in which
case the previous pair can even be disclosed as no relevant
information can be derived. Furthermore, via the use of a PUF,
the physical entity of the aircraft and respectively the LDACS
radio can be tied to the respective aircraft identity.
Now we want to put the results of the latency and data over-
head evaluation into perspective. In [25], [26], a STS based
MAKE scheme for LDACS was introduced and evaluated.
Comparing data overhead values from PMAKE to the scheme
of [26], we see that PMAKE requires 6% (DHKE), 23%
(ECDH), 6% (SIDH) less data for the entire MAKE procedure.
In terms of latency duration, PMAKE takes roughly the same
amount of time, when few aircraft are in an LDACS cell.
However, as the number of AS in a cell goes up, PMAKE can
take up 800ms longer. The reason for that is, PMAKE uses one
FL messages and two RL messages, while the proposed STS
scheme in [26] takes two FL messages and one RL message
and FL latency is usually smaller than RL latency. Here the
benefit of PMAKE is, an unauthorized AS can be ruled out
quicker, as the first message in the PMAKE scheme comes
from the AS.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the applicability of PUF, CR and DHKE
based AKE protocols was investigated. The goal was to derive
a new security paradigm for securing digital aeronautical
communications systems while taking LDACS’s architecture
and communication flows as example application.
It turned out that modifications of the HPK mutual au-
thentication scheme can improve the existing cybersecurity
architecture of LDACS. The scheme was extended with a key
exchange addition, leading to the proposed PMAKE scheme
offering a PUF-based mutual authentication key exchange.
As the CRPs are central to the security of the protocol, the
currently used CRP must not be disclosed to any unauthorized
party, as otherwise the security of the protocol is compromised.
Based on LDACS’s architecture and communication flows, we
evaluated the PMAKE scheme in terms of data and latency
overhead compared to previously proposed MAKE procedures
for LDACS. The results show that PMAKE requires less data
but can take more authentication latency times then previous
schemes.
For future research, we are going to model the proposed
PMAKE scheme in the symbolic model checker Tamarin and
proof its security properties. Another open question is how
to make the CRPs securely available for a certain GSC at the
time when an AS, matching those pairs, enters the LDACS cell
served by that GSC. This will also be part of future work.
APPENDIX
AeroMACS Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communication
System
AKE Authenticated Key Exchange
AOC Aeronautical Operational Control
AS Aircraft Station
ATN Air Traffic Network
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
BC Broadcast
BER Bit Error Rate
CA Certificate Authority
CC Common Control




DHKE Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
FCI Future Communications Infrastructure
FL Forward Link
GS Ground Station
GSC Ground Station Controller
HKDF HMAC Key Derivation Function
HPK HMAC-based RFID PUF mutual authentication
protocol
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IKEv2 IKE version 2
IoT Internet of Things
LDACS L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication
System
MAC Medium Access Layer
MAKE Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange
MF Multi Frame
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing
OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access
PHY-SDU Physical Layer Service Data Unit
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PMAKE Physical Unclonable Function based Mutual
Authentication Key Exchange
PUF Physical Unclonable Function
RA Random Access
RL Reverse Link
SARPS Standards and Recommended Practises
SESAR Single European Sky Air Traffic Management
Research
SF Super Frame
SIDH Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman
SRAM Static Random-Access Memory
STS Station to Station
VDLm2 VHF Digital Link Mode 2
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